Most Large Programs Trigger Two Dangerous Management Approaches
One of the balancing acts in large-scale program leadership is avoiding two equally dangerous management approaches.
At one end sits fluffy optimism. The program leadership team believes the strategy is right, the issues are manageable and, with enough energy, governance, reporting and hard work, the organisation will eventually work things out.
This often happens because leadership teams naturally draw analogies with historic programs they have delivered successfully before. On the surface, the new program feels familiar. The governance looks familiar. The reporting structures look familiar. The organisational mechanics appear broadly recognisable.
But underneath, the operational characteristics may have very little in common.
The dependency density is different. The migration complexity is different. The commercial exposure is different. The number of moving parts that must work together at exactly the right moment is often dramatically higher.
And this is where many organisations get caught out.
One of the biggest causes of major programs entering expensive tailspins is not incompetence, poor intent or lack of effort. It is the failure to recognise early enough that the organisation is dealing with a program operating in a completely different league from the ones it has managed successfully before.
Once organisations misclassify the nature of the program, a fairly predictable chain reaction often follows. Leadership teams begin applying governance models, delivery assumptions and management approaches developed in more stable and betterunderstood environments.
Initially, this often appears manageable because the early stages of large programs are relatively abstract: planning, governance, mobilisation, reporting, supplier alignment and investment approval.
The real operational complexity arrives later. And that is usually where the first signs of a bad cold start appearing.
At its most extreme, the mindset gradually becomes:
“We can do anything.”
Risks get softened. Warning signs become easier to discount. Confidence slowly starts replacing evidence.
After more than 30 years around major programs, we have seen plenty of this. And in fairness, many leadership teams simply do not have a natural frame of reference for programs operating at this higher level of complexity.
The real difficulty starts when organisations fail to recognise that some programs belong to a completely different category of operational challenge.
Most companies can successfully run many important programs with capable leadership, a decent PMO, experienced suppliers and relatively stable operating conditions.
Then there are the other programs. The two or three that investors and boards genuinely worry about. The ones involving multiple companies, live operational migration, national infrastructure, legacy systems, deeply intertwined dependencies and enormous commercial consequences if things go wrong.
These are not simply bigger versions of ordinary programs.
They behave very differently.
And this distinction matters enormously once real operational pressure starts building.
Try upgrading a national mobile network while millions of customers remain live. Try building a credible challenger to Openreach while simultaneously scaling infrastructure, systems, operations, funding and customer acquisition together.
Or try delivering large-scale Smart City infrastructure where transport systems, fibre networks, wireless infrastructure, software platforms, utilities and public services all need to function coherently together while the city itself continues operating normally.
Programs in this category quickly expose the limits of methodology alone.
Over the years, CEOs have often told us their organisations had dozens – sometimes hundreds – of people trained in PRINCE2 and similar delivery methods.
And that is not unimportant. Structured delivery methods, governance and discipline absolutely matter.
But programs that operate in a different league eventually expose the difference between certification and lived operational experience.
Once operational complexity reaches a certain level, success becomes less about following a process manual and more about judgement, orchestration, sequencing, dependency management and the ability to adapt coherently as conditions change.
Then the management behaviour starts changing.
Oversight expands. Escalations multiply. Budgets are cut. Micro-management increases. The organisation starts trying to govern its way back to certainty.
At its worst, organisations disappear into suffocating micro-management, oppressive governance and defensive reporting as leadership teams try to regain control of a system behaving very differently from the one they thought they were managing.
But once operational complexity reaches a certain level, organisations cannot simply “report their way back to control” through ever-expanding governance alone.
At some point, leadership teams have to learn how to operate realistically inside uncertainty rather than pretending uncertainty can be eliminated altogether.
That is usually where really experienced program directors eventually end up. Not blindly optimistic. Not permanently pessimistic. Just realistic enough to see the risks clearly, calm enough not to panic when turbulence arrives – and experienced enough to understand that large-scale programs often become messy long before they become impossible.
The encouraging part is that organisations do not have to drift toward either extreme.
Large, cross-company programs are genuinely difficult to land. That is simply reality. There is no pain-free remedy.
But experienced program teams are far more likely to choose management approaches that improve the odds of success rather than making the situation worse.
The important thing to remember is that neither extreme tends to work for long.
The truth is: relentless optimism eventually collides with operational reality.
And organisations rarely micro-manage their way successfully through programs operating in a different league.
Really experienced program directors understand this instinctively. They know that large programs need realism, operational discipline, strong judgement and calm decision-making under pressure.
Not fantasy. And certainly not paralysis.
If leadership teams recognise early enough that they are dealing with a program operating in a different league, they can usually avoid many of the predictable management behaviours that later push programs into expensive tailspins.
That does not make these programs easy.
But it improves the odds of landing them successfully very significantly.
About the author
David Hilliard is Founder of Mentor, execution specialists in strategic program execution.